Louisiana Law Review
Volume 14 | Number 4
Concepts of Legislative Power: A Symposium
June 1954

Article 1030, Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 - The
Prescription of Acceptance or Renunciation of
Successions
Charles C. Gray

Repository Citation
Charles C. Gray, Article 1030, Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 - The Prescription of Acceptance or Renunciation of Successions, 14 La. L. Rev.
(1954)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol14/iss4/9

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XIV

(2) Cumulation of parties should be permitted if there be
either a community of interest, or if the causes arise out of the
same facts-ex eodem facto.
(3) If the cumulation of parties is improper, any litigant
should be free to avail himself of the objection, for it is apparent
that his rights in the matter will be influenced and probably
prejudiced thereby.
(4) If the objection is sustained, the plaintiff should have
at least the prerogative of election and, possibly, if deemed
feasible, should receive the benefit of judicial division of his
claims, each to be tried separately, in the interest of expeditious
judicial action.
William D. Brown III

Article 1030, Louisiana Civil Code of 1870The Prescription of Acceptance or
Renunciation of Successions
Article 10301 states that: "The faculty of accepting or renouncing a succession becomes barred by the lapse of time required for the longest prescription of the rights to immovables."
This article is a literal translation of Article 7892 of the French
Civil Code and has appeared in all three of the Louisiana Civil
Codes. 3 To the French commentator Marcad6 its real meaning
seemed "facile."'4 Justice McCaleb, in a recent case,5 observed:
"[T]he literal meaning of the Article is perfectly clear and presents no problem of interpretation. ..

"

But he added: "Yet, there

is probably no other provision of our Code which has caused a
greater diversity of opinion than this Article." Judge Saunders,
speaking of Articles 1030 and 1031, says: "Now I do not know,
1. LA. CIVIL CoDE of 1870.
2. "La facult6 d'accepter ou de rdpudler une succession, se prescrtt par
le laps de temps requis pour la prescription la plus longue des droits immobillers."
3. LA. CIVIL CODE of 1808, 3.1.94, p. 164; Art. 1023, LA. CIVm CODE of 1825.
4. 3 MARCAD9, EXPLICATION DU CODE CIVIL 167 (7th ed. 1873): "Pour nous,
ces interprdtationsmultiplides et si contradictoiresnous ont toujours 4tonnd,
et le vrai sens de I'article nous a toujours paru facile."
5. Sun Oil Co. v. Tarver, 219 La. 103, 115, 52 So.2d 437, 441 (1951).
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nor do I know that anybody else ever knew, what these two
articles mean."'6 Justice Provosty remarked in a decision: "[T]o
invoke it for throwing light upon the proper interpretation of
some other article of the Code is simply to seek light out of
Cimmerian darkness."'7 It has been noted by the Louisiana Supreme Court that the various French commentators evolved
eight different interpretations." The Louisiana court has vacillated between two theories in interpreting Article 1030. The
purpose of this comment is to trace the development of these
theories in the Louisiana jurisprudence.
The court was first called upon to interpret this article in
1857 in Succession of Waters.9 In that case a wife was named heir
in her mother's will. She died before having accepted the legacy.
The only child of her marriage died several months later. Her
husband therefore became heir to the legacy of his wife's mother
by transmission from his wife through his child. He took no
action to claim the estate for more than thirty years. The question
was presented to the court whether or not he was barred from
then accepting by the prescription of thirty years provided by
Article 1030. The court found that he was so barred by the plain
language of the article but, because it was unnecessary in reaching the decision, declined to render a complete interpretation of
the article.' 0
The Waters case was cited with approval in a 1913 decision,"
2
but it was not until 1918 in Generes v. Bowie Lumber Co.' that
the question was fully considered. Generes had died testate in
1875, but his will did not mention the property which was the
6. SAUNDERS, LECTURES ON THE CIVIL CODE 205 (1925).

7. Harang v. Golden Ranch Land & Drainage Co., 143 La. 982, 1024, 79 So.
768, 788 (1918).
8. When it was suggested by counsel that the holding of Generes v.
Bowie Lumber Co., 143 La. 811, 79 So. 413 (1918) was at variance with some
of the French commentators, Justice O'Niell replied, "Our answer is that, as
the French commentators entertained eight different and conflicting opinions
of the meaning and effect of Article 789 of the French Code, we were compelled to depart from at least seven of them." Bendernagel v. Foret, 145 La.
115, 128, 81 So. 869, 873 (1919).
9. 12 La. Ann. 97 (1857).
1O. "We, therefore, conclude that the legislature intended to declare In
one part of the Article, that if he who is called to an inheritance is silent
for thirty years, and does no act, evincing his acceptance of the succession,
he is barred by prescription. We do not find it necessary to put any construction upon the second portion of the Article. It will be in time to
consider the difficulties presented by it whenever the case arises in which
their explanation, if possible, is required." 12 La. Ann. 97, 98-99 (1857).
11. Schultze v. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co., 131 La. 956, 60 So. 629 (1913).
12. 143 La. 811, 79 So. 413 (1918).
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subject of the suit. He left a surviving wife, two major daughters,
and a minor son. At the time the will was probated, the two
daughters renounced his succession. His wife died intestate in
1905. In 1916 the son brought an action against the Bowie Lumber
Company for timber trespass. The Bowie Company alleged that
this land was separate property of the father and interposed
the thirty years' prescription of Article 1030. In an opinion by
Justice O'Niell the court discarded the rule of the Waters case
and announced the theory that what prescribes at the end of
thirty years is the right to accept or renounce, depending upon
which faculty the heir has at that time. The regular heir is considered to be seized of the succession at the moment of the death
of the de cujus and the faculty which he loses at the end of
thirty years is the faculty to renounce, since he need not exercise
his faculty of acceptance at all in order to become vested with
the estate. The regular heir has, therefore, but one faculty to
lose at the end of thirty years-that of renunciation. The irregular
heir, since he must claim the succession in order for ownership
to vest in him, has only the faculty of acceptance, or more
properly, the right of claiming, which is lost by his failure to
exercise it within a period of thirty years. Therefore the plaintiff
in the Generes case by failing to exercise his right of renunciation
within thirty years was barred from so doing and, having been
barred from renouncing, was considered the unconditional owner.
The plea of prescription was overruled. The court pointed out
that since the plaintiff was a minor at the time of his father's
death, an acceptance was made for him by operation of the law.' 8
Justice Leche, dissenting, criticized the majority opinion as
13. The court cited Articles 352 and 977 of the Civil Code as authority.
Article 352: "It shall not be necessary for minor heirs to make any formal
acceptance of a succession that may fall to them, but such acceptance shall
be considered as made for them with benefit of inventory by operation of
law, and shall in all respects have the force and effect of a formal
acceptance."
Article 977: "No one can be compelled to accept a succession, In whatever manner it may have fallen to him, whether by testament or the operation of law. He may therefore accept or renounce it.
"It shall not he necessary for minor heirs to make any formal acceptance of a succession that may fall to them, but such acceptance shall be
considered as made for them with benefit of inventory by operation of law,
and shall in all respects have the force and effect of a formal acceptance."
This seems to have been a secondary ground or makeweight in the opinion. It has been subsequently held that the acceptance with benefit of
inventory by operation of law in favor of a minor heir operates as a full
and complete acceptance for the minor. Lee v. Jones, 224 La. 231, 69 So.2d
26 (1953), discussed page 874 infra. See also Tillery v. Fuller, 190 La. 586, 182
So. 683 (1938), discussed page 872 infra.
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contravening the articles of the Code which provide that no one
can be compelled to accept a succession' 4 and that a renunciation
of a succession is never presumed.' 5 He also criticized the majority for likening the seizin of the regular heir to possession in
fact and in effect converting the legal fiction of seizin into an
acceptance.
Harang v. Golden Ranch Land & DrainageCo.' 6 was decided
several months before the Generes case, but both were heard on
rehearing on the same day. 17 The court disposed of the contention that the thirty years prescription of Article 1030 was applicable by finding that the heir had in fact accepted the succession. The majority opinion on rehearing announced by way of
dicta what would seem to be a doctrine contrary to that of the
Generes case, affirmed on rehearing on the same day. The court
said: "By not accepting the succession within 30 years the heir
loses his inheritance, and the heir next in rank becomes vested
with the right of inheritance. . . ." The "representative of the
succession [heir with seizin] does not hold for himself, but for
whichever heir may eventually accept the succession, so that
when the heir first in rank suffers his faculty to accept to prescribe, and the heir next in rank accepts, the latter heir has in
fact possessed through the representative of the succession from
the time of the opening of the succession.' 8 This language seems
to contradict the theory of the Generes case that the regular heir,
by virtue of his seizin, need not accept the succession within
thirty years to have full ownership vested in him.'9
In Bendernagel v. Foret,20 decided the next year, the court
reaffirmed the holding in the Generes case. Justice O'Niell, who
wrote the majority opinion in the Generes case, was also organ
for the court in the Bendernagel case. The Justice refers in the
opinion to "what was said" 21 in the Harangcase and states: "[A]s
14. Art. 977. LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870, quoted In note 13 supra.
15. Art. 1017, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870: "The renunciation of a succession is
not presumed, it must be made expressly by public act before a notary, in
presence of two witnesses."
16. 143 La. 982, 79 So. 768 (1918).
17. The Harang case was decided on January 28, 1918, and Judgment
affirmed on rehearing on June 29, 1918. The Generes case was decided on
April 11, 1918, and application for rehearing refused on June 29, 1918.
18. 143 La. 982, 1022, 79 So. 768, 788 (1918).
19. Chief Justice Monroe, in his dissent In the Harang case, points out
that the Generes decision was not brought to the attention of the court until
after the Harang case had been well considered.
20. 145 La. 115, 81 So. 869 (1919).
21. 145 La. 115, 129, 81 So. 869, 874 (1919).
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to a coheir who has accepted the succession, or as to the heir
next in degree who has accepted, the heir at law who has not
accepted becomes a stranger to the succession at the end of 30
years. '22 It would appear that the Justice had in mind Article
1031,23 although that article was not specifically cited as authority. The pertinent part of Article 1031 provides: "So long as the
prescription of the right of accepting is not acquired against the
heirs who have renounced, they have the faculty to accept the
succession, if it has not been accepted by other heirs.... ." (Italics
supplied.) This article is apparently applicable only where a
regular heir has renounced, 24 which would seem to be a different
situation from that contemplated by Article 1030. In any event,
such a holding was not necessary to reach the decision in the
Bendernagel case. However, as will be seen later, this notion
was incorporated into subsequent cases 25 and has been corrected
26
only recently.
The inconsistency of this notion with the theory of the
Generes case may be emphasized by asking the following questions: If the seizin of the regular heir is sufficient to provide him
with the attributes of ownership so that he has no need of making
an acceptance of the succession, why should the acceptance,
formal or tacit, of one regular heir exclude his coheir who has
not accepted within 30 years? Can the seizin of one heir be of a
different quality from his coheir? If no acceptance is necessary
on the part of the regular heir, why should an unnecessary act
on the part of his coheir put that person in a better position?
In Schreiber v. Beer's Widow and Heirs,27 the court held on
rehearing, again in an opinion by Justice O'Niell, that the regular
heirs and the widow in community are not personally liable for
the debts of the succession and community unless they have expressly or tacitly accepted. Referring to the Generes and Bendernagel cases Justice O'Niell says: "It was not held, in either of
those cases, that an heir who had not renounced the succession
was within the period of 30 years presumed to have accepted,
22. 145 La. 115, 129, 81 So. 869, 874 (1919).
23. LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.

24. It was so applied in Succession of Hymel, 49 La. Ann. 461, 21 So. 641
(1897).
25. Barnsdall Oil Co. v. Applegate, 218 La. 572, 50 So.2d 197 (1950); Tillery
v. Fuller, 190 La. 586, 182 So. 683 (1938).
26. Lee v. Jones, 224 La. 231, 69 So.2d 26 (1953); Sun Oil Co. v. Tarver,
219 La. 103, 52 So.2d 437 (1951).
27. 150 La. 676, 91 So. 149 (1921).
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and might be held liable personally for a debt of the deceased,
without having been proceeded against by the method provided
in article 1055 of the Civil Code and in articles 977 and 979 of the
Code of Practice to compel the heir to elect whether he will
accept or renounce the succession. '28 (Italics supplied.) Chief
Justice Monroe disagreed with this passage in the majority decision, being of the opinion that the Generes and Bendernagel
cases did hold that the regular heir who has not renounced is
presumed to have accepted. He concurred in the decision in the
Schreiber case but felt that it was in conflict with holdings of the
Generes and Bendernagel cases and that these cases should be
overruled. In the opinion of the writer these cases are not in
conflict with the holding of the Schreiber case. In the Schreiber
case thirty years had not elapsed. The theory of the Generes case,
as appears from the very language dissented from by the Chief
Justice, 29 was that complete ownership was vested in the regular
heir who had not renounced after the passage of thirty years
time; until the passage of thirty years the regular heir held the
succession property subject only to the possibility of defeasance
by his own act of renunciation. This is not in conflict with the
idea that he may still exercise that right of defeasance at any
time before the passage of thirty years. The theory of the Chief
Justice, as indicated by his dissent in the Generes, Bendernagel
and Harang cases and reiterated in the Schreiber case, was that
with the passage of thirty years the inactive heir becomes a
stranger to the succession and no longer has any right therein.3 0
In 1922, in Dew v. Hammett,31 the court reaffirmed the
Generes case and said: "[T]he question that an heir has no other
right or faculty to lose by prescription under article 1030 of the
Code than the right or faculty of renouncing may be considered
set at rest.' 32 In 1937 the court held that acknowledged illegit28. 150 La. 676, 691, 91 So. 149, 155 (1921).
29. The Chief Justice quotes from the Generes case as follows: "At the
expiration of the 30 years the status of the person or relation is irrevocably
fixed by the prescription established by Article 1030 of the Code, either as an
heir or not as an heir, depending upon what his status was before the 30
years ended. To illustrate: If he was a forced heir, or if he was a legal heir,
and there was no forced heir nor universal legatee, he is presumed, if he
has not renounced the succession, irrevocably to have accepted it at the end
of 30 years, for his right or faculty of renouncing is then prescribed." 143 La.
811, 822, 79 So. 413, 416-17 (1918).
30. This view has recently been adopted by the court in Sun Oil Co. v.
Tarver, 219 La. 103, 52 So.2d 437 (1951) and affirmed in Lee v. Jones, 224 La.
231, 69 So.2d 26 (1953).
31. 150 La. 1094, 91 So. 523 (1922).
32. 150 La. 1094, 1098, 91 So. 523, 524 (1922).
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imates who had not claimed the succession of their natural
mother were barred from then asserting their claim by the passage of thirty years. But since prescription was suspended by
minority as to some of the heirs, they were allowed to come in
and claim the entire succession.88
In 1938, in Tillery v. Fuller,8 4 a suit over valuable oil land,
the court was presented with a situation in which one heir had
accepted the succession by going into possession and other heirs
had remained silent for more than thirty years. The court referred to the language quoted from Bendernagel v. Foret35 and
held that where one heir has accepted the succession his coheirs
are barred by the passage of thirty years. Justice O'Niell, then
Chief Justice, again wrote the majority opinion. On application
for rehearing the attention of the court was directed to the fact
that at the time of the death of the de cujus several of the heirs
were minors and that the holding of the court would contravene
the provisions of the Code relating to acceptance with benefit of
inventory in favor of minors.86 The court said in a per curiam
opinion: "These articles, when read in connection with article 1030
of the Civil Code, mean merely that the law protects the minor
heir, during his or her minority, against the consequence of a
failure to formally accept the succession. But, when the minor
arrives at the age of majority, he has only thirty years from that
time in which to accept the succession, or his failure to accept
will inure to the benefit of any coheir or coheirs who may have
accepted, or of any heir next in degree8' 7who may have accepted,
by going into possession of the estate.

That the foregoing is inconsistent with the holding in the
Generes case may be seen from the following language from
that case: "The plaintiff in this case was not only a forced heir,
being a son, of Louis F. Generes, but was a minor child when
his father's succession was opened. It was never necessary for him
to accept the succession. The law accepted it for him, with benefit
of inventory." ' In the opinion of the writer the rule of the Tillery
33. Succession of Tyson, 186 La. 516, 172 So. 772 (1937).
34. 190 La. 586, 182 So. 683 (1938).
35. 145 La. 115, 81 So. 869 (1919).
36. Arts. 352, 977, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870, quoted in note 13 supra.
37. 190 La. 586. 664-65, 182 So. 683, 709 (1938). In a companion case the
court held that the prescription provided for by Article 1030 is not, in the
absence of fraud, tolled by the nonresidence of the heir and his resulting
ignorance of his rights. Smith v. Tyson, 193 La. 571, 192 So. 61 (1939).
38. 143 La. 811, 825-26, 79 So. 413, 418 (1918). See also note 13 supra.
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case is also inconsistent with the main theory of the Generes
case, as has been previously observed.
The Generes case was again affirmed in 1950, 89 and the following year a fact situation similar to Tillery v. Fuller was
presented to the court. In that case 40 the mortgaging of the whole
estate by children of a second marriage was held to bar the claim
of the children of the first marriage who had allowed thirty years
to pass in silence. Tillery v. Fuller and Bendernagel v. Foret were
cited as authority for the holding.
Later in 1951 another case, Sun Oil Co. v. Tarver,41 came
before the court. In that case regular heirs who had not accepted
were again held to be barred by the prescription of thirty years
because of a prior acceptance by their coheirs. It was argued by
counsel for the excluded heirs that the holdings in Bendernagel
v. Foret and Tillery v. Fuller were inconsistent with the theory
announced by the court in Generes v. Bowie Lumber Co. and that
these cases therefore should be overruled. The court, speaking
through Justice McCaleb, recognized the conflict and held that it
was not the Bendernageland Tillery decisions which were wrong,
but the long-established theory of the Generes case. The court
noted that a correct decision had been reached in all of the previous cases but that the "predicate" of the Generes case was
faulty. 42 The court said: "The Article [1030], placed as it is under
the part of the Civil Code dealing with the acceptance and renunciation of successions, is a prescription and not a peremption
and inures to the relief of the succession and its representatives
and to the benefit of those heirs, who have accepted, from and
against all claims of heirship after the 30 year period has accrued.
For this reason alone, it seems manifest that a trespasser, or one
holding land or other succession property without semblance of
right or title, as in Generes v. Bowie Lumber Co., Bendernagel
v. Foret, Dileo v. Dileo and Dew v. Hammett either by conveyances from the succession representatives or heirs or by an acquired prescription, cannot plead the prescription provided for
in Article 1030 as the faculty lost by the heir, who fails to accept
39. Dileo v. Dileo, 217 La. 103, 46 So.2d 53 (1950).
40. Barnsdall Oil Co. v. Applegate, 218 La. 572, 50 So.2d 197 (1950).
41. 219 La. 103, 52 So.2d 437 (1951).
42. "(Ilt does not necessarily follow that the conclusion reached in those
cases or, for that matter, in Generes v. Bowie Lumber Co., are incorrect. On
the contrary, after a careful view of the cases involving Article 1030, we are
convinced that the result reached in each and every one of them is right."
219 La. 103, 121, 52 So.2d 437, 443 (1951).
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within thirty years, can only be availed of by the succession or
those claiming through it as in Succession of Waters; Tillery
v. Fuller; Succession of Tyson and Barnsdall Oil Company v.
Applegate. ' ' 43 The decision treats all heirs, regular or irregular,
as strangers to the succession when they fail to act towards the
succession during the thirty-year prescriptive period, with the
exception, however, that this bar may be pleaded only by the
succession or its representatives. It should be noticed that the
court made no mention of the acceptance provided for minors
by operation of law.
In the recent case of Lee v. Jones44 a father died, leaving
two children, one a major and one a minor. Some time later the
minor daughter married and left home. The major, a son, stayed
on the farm and thereby tacitly accepted the succession. The
question presented to the court was whether the heirs of the
daughter were barred from claiming her share more than thirty
years later. The court held that according to Articles 977 and
35245 the law accepts for the minor with benefit of inventory and
that this has the same effect as a formal acceptance. The heirs
of the daughter were therefore not barred since the law had
operated an acceptance in her favor upon the death of her father.
On rehearing this holding was affirmed, the court stating: "The
contention is made that if we do not follow the per curiam in
the case of Tillery v. Fuller, supra, we are doing violence to the
Louisiana rule of property. Our common law brothers have the
rule of stare decisis. Such rule does not prevail in Louisiana.
' 46
Each case must stand or fall on its own facts.
The theory adopted by the court in Sun Oil v. Tarver and reiterated in Lee v. Jones is a simple and, in the opinion of the
writer, a workable interpretation of Article 1030. Whether or not
it is the correct interpretation of Article 1030 viewed in the context of the entire Code is more doubtful. The present theory
is that at the end of thirty years the heir who has taken no action
towards the succession becomes a stranger to the succession and
may exercise none of the rights or privileges of his heirship. This
43. 219 La. 103, 122, 52 So.2d 437, 443 (1951).
44. 224 La. 231, 69 So.2d 26 (1953).
45. LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870. See note 13 supra.

46. 69 So.2d 26, 32 (La. 1953).

Justice Hawthorne dissented from the

overruling of Tillery v. Fuller, saying: "However, I do not base my dissent
on the logic of the rule as announced in Tillery v. Fuller, but, as stated

above, simply on the fact that this court should not overrule a holding such
as this, so long established, accepted, and relied upon, which affects the title
of individuals to real property." 69 So.2d 26, 33 (La. 1953).
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limitation may, however, be availed of only by the succession
or its representatives. Thus an heir, even though the thirty years'
prescription has run against him, may still assert his rights
against trespassers and other third persons who are without some
right emanating from the succession or its representatives.
In Lee v. Jones the court followed the letter of the law and
held that the law accepts for the minor heir and that this acceptance is full and complete. It may be assumed that the only
portion of Tillery v. Fuller meant to be overruled was the per
curiam opinion, which held that prescription was only suspended
during the minority of an heir. To overrule the remainder of the
holding that an heir who has allowed thirty years to pass in
silence is barred by the acceptance of his coheir would be to go
directly in the teeth of the Tarver case, which was expressly
affirmed.
Little of the basic problem of interpreting Article 1030, which
troubled the court so much in the early cases, has been solved.
As may be seen from an analysis of all the decisions considering
this article, the court has "come out the same door wherein it
went." Unless one concludes from the Tarver case that at the
end of thirty years the heir becomes bound for the debts of the
succession, no meaning has been given to the "or renounce"
phrase of the article. The Tarver case concludes merely that the
heir becomes a stranger to the succession. But can it be said that
a stranger is bound for the succession debts and liabilities? Search
for a complete exegesis of the article in the Tarver theory thus
seems fruitless.
The Generes theory, consistently applied, would avoid this
omission of the "or renounce" phrase. It would give full effect to
the literal meaning of the article and harmonize with the concepts of seizin and regular and irregular heirship. A consistent
application of the theory would, however, fail to give effect to
what apparently impresses the court as a matter of justice,
equity and policy-that the heir who has remained in silence
should not stand in the same position as the heir who has acted
and assumed responsibility. As has been previously noted, if
the Generes theory is to be applied, logical consistency requires
all regular heirs to be equally seized.
In all the cases presented to the court involving an inactive
heir and a coheir who has accepted, the court has ruled in favor
of the coheir, which is probably more in line with the spirit of
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the law as reflected in the rest of the Civil Code than a literal
interpretation of the article would be. Since an instance would
be rare in which debts or liabilities of a succession would remain
in force for thirty years, it is doubtful whether the court will
ever be called upon to give meaning to the "or renounce" phrase
of the article. Except for this one inconsistency, which for practical reasons will probably never be presented to the court, the
Tarver theory offers a simple and workable solution to this
troublesome problem of interpretation.
Charles C. Gray

Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
PART I
The congestion of the Supreme Court docket seems to have
led the court to insist vigorously upon the complete fulfillment of all the requirements for establishing its appellate
jurisdiction. The practice under the new Rule IX 1 of reshuffling
the voluminous matters awaiting adjudication has not stopped
the influx of appealable cases, and effective relief can be2 found
only in further limiting the court's appellate jurisdiction.
Constitutional restriction of the court's appellate jurisdiction
has consistently been accomplished by increasing the minimum
jurisdictional amount.3 If no constitutional convention is forthcoming within the next year, a constitutional amendment to re-4
lieve the bottleneck on appeals would seem to be warranted.
1. Rule IX of the Supreme Court, §§ 2-4, Revised October 4, 1951, effective
January 1, 1952, permits assignment of cases to the preference docket in case
of a rehearing, a special assignment, advancement to the preference docket,
or certification of questions by the courts of appeal. "Section 3. Any case
on the regular docket may be transferred to the preference docket, . . . by
order of the Court founded on a written motion of the attorney . . . representing any party to the suit requesting the transfer. ... Special assignments are made under Section 4 where the state or its subdivisions are
parties, and in matters impressed with "public interest" or, finally, in cases
in which the court, "upon the showing made, believes that the ends of
.
justice require an immediate hearing ..
2. LA. CONST. Art. VII, § 10.
3. The Constitutions of 1812, 1845, 1852, and 1864 required $300; the
Constitution of 1868 effected a change to $500, which was retained in the
Constitution of 1879. The latter was amended pursuant to La. Acts 1882, No.
125, p. 174 to fix the minimum at $2,000, which was retained in the 1898,
1913 and 1921 Constitutions.
4. H.B. No. 202 of the 1954 legislature proposed a constitutional amendment to LA. CONST. Art. VII, § 10, which would have restricted the civil

